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Most of this paper1 will consist in the setting up of premises for the 
purpose of making two or three fairly simple points. Some of those 
premises will be about structuralist semiology, which I take to be 
relatively familiar. Nevertheless, for the purposes of exposition, I shall take 
the familiar version of structuralism, as a homogeneous theoretical field 
identifiable by a few key terms ('synchronic/diachronic', langue/parole, 'arbitrary/-
motivated' etc.) as imprecise, and shall re-do it as a set of controversies over 
particular issues. The use of Peirce made, for instance, by Jakobson or by 
Eco are intelligible from the positions taken in these debates. The other 
premises will be about Peirce, which I take to be relatively unfamiliar, 
and which, I shall 'do', taking the risks of an objectifying exegesis. 
The points I shall make will pertain to both the "theory" and the 
"applications" of semiotics, principally during the 1970s. What I am 
calling, with scare marks, the "theory" is the set of propositions taken to 
define the presuppositions of semiotics and the range of objects to which 
they are deemed to apply. Under the head of "applications", I shall limit my 
discussion toJakobsonon language, and Metz and Wollen on the cinema. 
The scare marks, of course, are pincers, designed to show that what was 
joined in heaven has been put asunder by the unnatural tendency of 
language, and theory, to make problematical distinctions. 
I suppose, quant a moi, that the distinction between "theory" and 
"application" is less a distinction of the kind of propositions made- it is 
not a question of wondering about the theoretical contents of application, 
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or the applicability of theories- and more a distinction between genres of 
theoretical writing. On this view, the kind of writing I am engaged in is 
"theoretical", since it is concerned with the implications for the theory of 
the application of Peircean concepts (to objects such as language and film) 
and not with the pay-off that such applications had in the description of 
semiotic objects such as language and film. That these applications are 
part of a project to write "theories" of their respective objects goes, I hope, 
without saying. 
One of the premises I have needed for the reading of Peirce has been 
the sharp distinction between 'representation' and 'signification'. 
Peirce's theory of the sign is a theory of representation: a sign 
represents something (its object) to something(its interpretant) in some 
respect or capacity (its ground)2. Diagrammatically-
OBJECT 
2nd correlate 
REPRESENT AMEN 
(Ground) 
1st correlate 
INTERPRET ANT 
3rd correlate 
The term 'sign', in Peirce, denotes this complex of correlations. 
Speaking Peirce-language: this complex of correlations is the object of 
the term 'sign', whose 'ground' is a concept of representation. Any 
reading of Peirce's semiotic will be an interpretant of the way the term 
'sign' construes this object. This construal, further, will be an 
explicitation of the ground of the term 'sign' and the interpretant will 
tease out its implications. 
Readings of Peirce have, caricaturally, fallen into two broad categories 
(this excludes the philosophical work, which has, appropriately to its 
disciplinary conventions, treated "Peirce" as a collection of philosophical 
issues, and has not, properly speaking, produced readings of Peirce but 
readings of these issues.) I have distinguished between the two groups 
of readings in terms of the decision that informs them as to whether, or 
not, Peirce is "useful": 
I: Peirce cannot be used, because -
(a) Peirce is an idealist. The world ('the object') is so totally bound up 
in the sign that the theory excludes material existence. 
or: (b) Peirce is a naive empiricist: signs refer to a preconstituted real 
world. 
II: Peirce can be used to supplement structuralist semiology, because 
(a) for him, signs are about something ('the object'), thus re-admitting 
'content' to the discussion. 
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and (b) this content is related to the pragmatic dimension of 
communication by the requirement that the definition of signhood 
include interpretation, through the 'interpretant'. 
II(a) and II(b) above are also invoked as reasons for not using Peirce in 
theoretical linguistics, from which it is clear that Il(a) and Il(b) are 
versions of I(b). Peirce has become the place for the readmission of real 
speakers in a real world. 
The only thing right about any of these readings is that they take 
Peirce (i.e. Peirce as a metonym for his writings on signs) as a "sign". 
That is, as interpretants, they take 'Peirce' as a sign, where 'sign' is 
not, as in Saussure, a member of a set or signifying system, but a 
discursive unit: here, a theory, a knowledge. Of course, we always do. 
And Peirce is about this fact. It is not about codes and the rules and 
units that constitute the grammar of such systems: it is about the 
discursive constitution of knowledge of the world,3 the making of 
theories, their systematization, their unmaking, their entry into 
dictionaries and their fall from grace. Let us leave aside, for the time 
being, the complexities of the ontology of the "world" as explored by 
Peirce- the metaphysician - perhaps to return to them later, for the 
problem of the object won't just go away. 
'Saussure', the theory of signification, is about the making of 
differences - pertinent differences, the differences that make a 
difference. Difference is the condition sine qua non of signhood, that 
which constitutes value, and thus function, in and according to the 
rules of a system. It is thus the formal condition that must be satisfied 
before any signifying, even theorising, can get under way. The 
necessary, but not the sufficient condition, for all acts of discourse. It 
starts with the code: in Jakobson's elaboration, the distinctive phono-
logical feature; in Benveniste's construal of the signified, the lexico-
semiotic differential. If 'Saussure' is about the enabling condition of 
signification, and Peirce is about what is enabled, representation/-
knowledge of the world, discourse (but what of text?), then they must, 
so the argument might run, be complementary. Were we to pursue this 
line of argument - and you never can tell, we may do just that - it 
would take us to a point where we could see that the two theories, 
though complementary under certain conditions, are not symmetrical. 
For if it is the case that the theory of difference is the necessary 
condition for signification, representation is not, on the other hand, its 
necessary product. Nor, as Barthes for instance4 has amply shown, does 
representation exhaust the productiveness of signification. To limit 
what is enabled by signification to representation - under however 
sophisticated a construal - is to limit the implications of the theory of 
signification by eliding the significant differences between the two 
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problematics. The argument as to the complementarity of 'Saussure' 
and 'Peirce' thus has a trap built into it. The trap is sprung by the 
elision of 'signification' into 'representation', whereby (propositional or 
represented) content re-emerges as central in discussions of the 
semiotic. It is a trap -dangerous and undesirable, to be avoided with 
assiduity - because a generalised concept of meaning such as this 
excludes from the purview of semiotics music, architecture, gestures, 
table manners, the intonations of speech, dance, dress, and rhetoric, 
including genre. Formal languages such as numbers present parallel, 
but other problems; insofar as they can be construed as "having 
objects" - the performance, for musical notation, for instance, the 
building, for architectural drawing, the proposition, for symbolic logic, 
they can be considered under a problematic of representation. But their 
modus operandi, their conventions, their character as rule-governed 
systems of arbitrary signs, cannot be adequately described on this 
basis. 
My very simple argument will be, that structuralist uses of Peirce 
have fallen into this trap; that insofar as they work on the premise of 
the complementarity of 'Saussure' and 'Peirce', they have overlooked 
the difference between theories of signification and theories of 
representation, and have reproduced from this oversight a generalised 
concept of 'meaning' which it had been the business of the premise of 
the primacy of the significant and the systemic determinants of value, 
to displace. 
* * * * * 
It was principally the work of Jakobson in the mid-60s and, following 
him, that of Eco in the 70s, that installed Peirce in the centre of the 
questions to be considered by the burgeoning "science of signs". Peirce 
had, before this, been considered marginal to the interests of European 
semiology;5 now it is rare to read work in semiotics or literary theory 
which does not at least allude to the Peircean notions of infinite 
semiosis and the interpretant,6 or to the distinction between icon, 
index, and symboJ.7 The "use(r)s of Peirce", however, fall roughly into 
two groups, according to which of these two sets of concepts they allude 
to. Even Jakobson, who does use them both, does so in different places 
and for different purposes. One would be excused for thinking, on the 
basis of this, that Peirce's work was a collection of heteroclite notions, 
where the taxonomic programme, and the inspired notion of the 
productiveness of the signifying process were, if not in outright conflict, 
at least of little help to one another. 
In the structuralist uses of Peirce, broadly speaking, each of these 
sets of concepts is brought in tu solve a particular problem. To read the 
uses will therefore be a wa) ol reading the problems that were posed by, 
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or in, the current understanding of the Saussurean model. Broadly 
speaking, "the interpretant" is brought in to solve the apparent 
paradox of the practice of post-Barthes literary theory, wherein the 
Saussurean theory of the sign and of language is placed as authority for 
the gesture of reading which, at the same time, it is claimed, it can in no 
way theorise. A model of the sign such as Peirce's, which permits and 
indeed requires "interpretation" for signhood to be achieved or, better, 
performed, is allegedly superior to a theory of the sign which remains 
embedded in its system, excluding all human agency from the 
principles of its operation. A caricatural form of this line of argument 
will take Peirce's terms 'object' and 'sign' to correspond, respectively, 
with the 'signified' and the 'signifier' of Saussurean theory. Thus 
Peirce supplements Saussure, as the interpretant supplements the 
code. And as the human supplements the structural. On the other hand, 
the distinction drawn by Peirce, and first taken up by Barthes8 and by 
Jakobson, 9 between three kinds of sign, the icon, the index, and the 
symbol, has most frequently been used in the attempts to produce a 
semiotics of the visual, whether of photography, film, or painting and 
drawing. Here the term 'symbol' is taken to correspond to the 
Saussurean sign, since it is defined as the kind of sign that operates by 
convention, while 'icon' and 'index' are taken to be two forms of quasi-
natural sign, the icon operating by resemblance, and thus appropriate 
to the visual representation of reality, and the index operating by causal 
or existential connection with its object (symptoms, weather-vanes, and 
shifters are the usual examples), and thus used, first by Peirce himself, 
to theorise the relation of the photograph with its object, insofar as this 
relation is governed by the physics of light. What is at issue here is the 
alleged incompetence of the principles of arbitrariness and of signification 
to found a description of signs other than linguistic signs and traffic-
signals:10 two great families of signs, theorised by two unrelated 
grandfathers. The relation in-law was forged, however, when the 
requirement was put on general sign-theory to deal with the so-called 
real world. If icons and indices belonged in the same taxonomy as 
symbols, then the Saussurean theory was simply, and legitimately, 
restricted to this latter class, leaving Peirce to cover the questions of the 
observable forms of the real (the icon) and the guarantees we give to 
ourselves of its ontological substance (the index). Again, the figure is a 
form of supplementation, and again what requires to be supplemented 
is the conventional sign-unit of structuralist theory whose theoretical 
abstraction is rendered more humane by the retrieval of the subject and 
object of knowledge. 
You can see, I suppose, why I'm suspicious. 
Structuralism revisited 
No structuralist, however, could be more suspiCious than was 
Benveniste. Asked to write a paper on "La semiologie de la langue" for 
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the first issue of Semiotica in 1971,11 he produced what is taken, in 
American Peirce scholarship, to be a scandalously ill-informed dismissal 
of Peirce in favour of a linguistic semiology on Saussurean principles. 12 
My view of this paper, however, is that it is at least extremely 
instructive, and probably more interesting than that. I take it as an 
intelligent naming of the issues that would have to be raised in any 
encounter, or joining, of the two traditions. 
Benveniste's discussion is written from the point of view of a 
working linguist, that is, someone for whom the description of "une 
langue" is the methodological imperative. Whatever helps me to 
describe, say, the structures of Sanskrit or Swahili, Japanese or 
Javanese, Italian or Ukrainian, is potentially helpful as long as the 
borrowed principles are theoretically coherent with all the others I shall 
put to work. From this point of view, there are, according to Benveniste, 
some serious incompatibilities between Peirce's theory of the sign and 
Benveniste's version of Saussurean theory_ The first is, that there can 
be no distinction between langue and parole for Peirce. This causes a 
problem for Benveniste, and a solution for Jakobson, since they are 
opposed on precisely this point. Jakobson espouses a functionalist 
perspective, which refuses the exclusion of problems of speaking from 
problems of code or system; Benveniste, on the other hand, was 
concerned to produce a specific set of theoretical principles for the study 
of discourse. Jakobson was arguing against what he took to be an 
ontological distinction between two realms; Benveniste by contrast, 
was arguing the methodological discontinuity of two different kinds of 
problems. Given this, then, Peirce's position is untenable for Benveniste, 
since the theoretical and methodological specificity of the domain of 
questions of "Ia langue" cannot be maintained from it; given Benveniste's 
topic, "la semiologie de Ia langue", Peircean semiotic has the status of 
the pre-theoreticaL Allow me, then, to anticipate my discussion of 
Jakobson's use of Peirce: given the continuity of code and discourse 
supposed by the functionalist position, it is not surprising that it is just 
for this reason that Jakobson can ask the same question as Benveniste 
- "can Peirce help me to do descriptive linguistics?" - and come out 
with the opposite answer. 
It is for the same reason that the question of reference is taken up by 
these two theorists in quite different ways. For Benveniste the question 
of reference is asked, and answered, in terms of the theory of discourse, 
the enunciation: reference is not inherent to the code or the system. 
While it is true that the code assigns referring tasks to certain signs, 
reference as such is occasional and local, and performed by the action of 
language in use. On the other hand, because for Jakobson the theory of 
language includes a prediction of its function, the referential function is 
never specified as being either systemic or occasionaL It is therefore 
perfectly consistent with his general position that he can adopt 
Peircean terminology for signs that refer, "the index", "indexical"_ 
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Thirdly, the Saussurean concept of langue derives from Durkheimian 
anthropology: a language is a cultural system. The question that opens 
the Course in general linguistics is not the question "what is 
language?" but the question "what is a language?"13 - what, in other 
words, are the criteria whereby we assign some expressions to English 
and others to French? what is it that makes these two systems 
discontinuous with one another, despite their common ancestry? 
Jakobson's question, in stark contrast, as revealed in titles such as 
"Quest for the essence of language", 14 is "what is language?", and is 
thus much closer to the Chomskyan reworking of the Saussurean 
problematic. Benveniste's topic, "Semiologie de Ia langue, presup-
poses the discontinuity of one language with another. Now, given that 
Peirce's theory of the sign derives not from a consideration of 
languages, but from logic, construed as a universal language of reason, 
in place to transcend the approximate truths and the ambiguities of 
natural languages, Benveniste's rejection of Peirce is entirely appropriate. 
The sign, in the two, is a different sort of thing. 
A further point at issue for Benveniste in relation with Peirce is the 
principle of the arbitrary nature of the (linguistic) sign. This principle 
is designed to account for the fact that, though for instance many 
European cultures may share large parts of the material world, they 
don't talk about them in the same way. Why 'ox' instead of 'boeuf' for 
example? Why 'tree' instead of 'arbor'? These examples, as they are 
given and discussed in Saussure, have led to the possibility of a serious 
misconstrual of the question: writing in 1939,15 Benveniste claimed 
that the signs of language were 'arbitrary with respect to the referent', 
but non-arbitrary in relation to the rest of the language. This would 
seem to mean that within the language there is a necessary relation of 
signifier with signified; any shift in this relation then, would have to 
be determined by something other than the code. One wonders if this 
agency could possibly be the speaker. The dangerous word is 
'motivated'. This construal of the principle has led to a serious set of 
problems in metaphor theory, amongst others. My own view of the 
matter, following Saussure and a later argument of Benveniste not 
directly related to this issue, 16 is that both signifer and signified are 
the product of difference; this being so, it is equally arbitrary for the 
value of definite article to be assigned to the syllable 'the', and 
indefinite to 'a', as for the values of 'enunciation' and 'annunciation' to 
be as they are. Jakobson takes a position similar to that of the 1939 
statement of Benveniste, arguing for a degree of 'relative motivation' 
in the deployment of signs. 17 The problem is that the terms 'arbitrary' 
and 'conventional' have, in this regard, been taken to be interchange-
able. My preference is to treat them as complementary: the signifying 
bond between signifier and signified is both arbitrary and conventional. 
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Arbitrary, because not governed by the pre-coded world, and conven-
tional, because rule-governed. It is thus open to play, but not to 
disregard, and it is necessitated neither by nature nor by culture. 
Benveniste's construal of this problem allows us to explain a major 
objection he makes to Peirce. For Benveniste, the relevant distinction 
is the one that would oppose what is 'inside' language to what is 
'outside' it: 'inside the language' corresponds to culture, 'outside' 
corresponds to nature, and again, this opposition simply has no place 
in Peirce. Peircean semiotic is an attempt to account for 'knowledge'; 
as such. it is all within the ambit of the human, knowledge of nature 
being not essentially different from knowledge of any other phenomena. 
Knowledge has 'objects', and these objects are both of the sign, and 
projected by the sign as being distinct from itself. Benveniste takes this 
point in Peirce to transgress the boundary between language and the 
world. Taking the 'object' as necessarily ontologically distinct from the 
sign, Benveniste argues that the Peircean sign cannot serve to define the 
semiotic specificity of language. Furthermore, that there be an 
entailment of object with sign in Peirce seems to suggest a degree of 
naturalising necessity in the Peircean sign that would deny the 
theoretical force of the principle of arbitrariness. 
Coming up against the same problem is their reading of Peirce, both 
Eco and Jakobson JH make a slightly different move, but on basically the 
same grounds: true, they say, we can't really admit ontological objects. 
But Peirce himself makes a distinction between the 'dynamic object' 
and the 'immediate object'. Reading this as a metaphysical distinction, 
Jakobson and Eco select from this pair only the 'immediate object', 
relegating the 'dynamic object' to the realm, outside, of the non-
semiotic, and retaining the 'immediate object' to correspond with 
'denotation', or 'the object as represented'. Granted that the 'object as 
the sign itself represents it' is Peirce's own definition of the 'immediate 
object'. I would nonetheless quarrel with the construal given by the 
masters of the 'dynamic object'. My understanding of the dynamic 
object is that it is that against which, in scientific experimentation, the 
sign/theory/representation is tested, that which, in Peirce's words, 
can 'surprise us' - a capacity that the 'object as represented in the 
sign' manifestly lacks. Surprise is the counter to predictability, the 
always-already known, the only thing with the power to change our 
minds/signs/theories, the as-yet-unsaid impinging on the talked-over, 
the site of discontinuity and the place for questions. It may indeed lie 
outside the bounds of language construed as a synchronic system; but 
it is not beyond the semiotic, insofar as this is concerned with 
'knowability'. For the thing radically beyond knowledge is not 
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the representation should conform, writes Peirce, "is something in the 
nature of a representation, or sign- something noumenal, intelligible, 
conceivable, and utterly uD.like a thing in itself' (5,533, my emphasis). 
Recognised in its unfamiliarity, it is 'dynamic', in Peirce's eccentric 
usage, because it is in a relation of contrast- the intellectual version 
of 'reaction' -with the system of predictabilities and interpretations 
already in place. 19 
The point I have been discussing relies on the nexus between the prin· 
ciple of arbitrariness and the principle of synchronicity in structuralist 
theory, and goes, I think, to the heart of the matter. Peirce's theory is 
not synchronic, but continuous, a theory of the transformation of 
knowledge(s). Even in their use of the concept of the interpretant, and 
infinite semiosis, however, Eco and Jakobson tie it to transformation 
within the network of signs that makes up the system. 20 The question 
of the 'inside' and the 'outside' of the sign/language/semiotic system 
cannot arise in a theory that is governed by a temporal, rather than a 
spatial model. By contrast, in a structuralist semiotics that assumes 
the continuity of language and discourse, discourse, it seems, ends up 
being thought under the same notion of 'system' as phonology or 
grammar. Benveniste's refusal of this move offers a naive, though 
paradoxically more satisfying, solution to the problem: langue is 
systemic, synchronic, arbitrary; only discours has as its business to 
refer to the world and say things about it. Thus, in "Ia semiologie de Ia 
langue" there is no place for Peirce. But in what Benveniste calls the 
'semantic' - discourse in its acts of referring and performing21 
there would most certainly be no incompatibility.22 
Peirce visited 
Peirce starts - not from the question "what is language?" - but 
from a post-Kantian problematic of the relation of the world to a mind. 
Where Kant models his formulation of the question on the classical 
view of the proposition, Peirce introduces 'the sign'- 'the representa-
men'- in the role of mediator. What is important about this move is 
that it aligns with his very strongly stated views on the basing of logic 
on non-psychological premises. By doing this, he reverses the relation 
between the mind and the sign, using the latter as model for the 
former, instead of the other way round. 'The sign', as a result takes on 
the status of a distinct problem, and while Peirce thought of himself as 
continuing, rather than changing, the Kantian project, the distinctness 
of the two emerges in various ways as Peirce gradually ·distinguishes 
the role of sign-theory from its place in metaphysics and epistemology, 
and gives it the function of a reworking of logic. One of his most 
frequently quoted titles is "Logic viewed as semiotics",23 where logic is 
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given three branches, each governed by one of the dimensions of 
signhood: Speculative Grammar, the study of the signhood of signs; 
Critic, or Logic Proper, the study of truth value; and Speculative 
Rhetoric, or Methodeutic, the study of the "development" of signs, 
their effects in circulation. 2' · 
The problem with writing a brief exposition of Peirce is that his 
writings cover some fifty years, and many of his views- especially on 
technical questions in logic - were considerably modified during this 
period. There is no definitive version. For the sake of convenience, I 
shall refer to the "early" and the "later" theories. since in respect of 
his theory of signs little of substance changes from 1865 until about 
1903. The early theory is recognisably Kantian, notwithstanding the 
importance of the concept of mediation; the later theory corresponds 
with the programme to enlarge the scope of logic, which can be dated 
from the Lowell Lectures of 1903-4. 
In the beginning, the mediating sign has, says Peirce, a material 
form, but this is "unimportant", a mere accident: the essence of the 
sign, of knowledge, is the representability of the world to the mind. 
This view is governed by the model of perception: the world, as it were, 
enters the mind through the senses, primarily vision. But the 
presupposition of this problematic - the conception of a fixed and 
stable meaning, entirely determined by the form of the object of 
knowledge - has no place in Peirce, who from the outset is less 
concerned with the contents of a cranium than with how knowledge is 
made, construing knowledge in a social, rather than an individual 
dimension. The problem of knowledge is modelled, then, not on 
perception, but on systematic knowledge, that is, the practices of 
science. Thus the sign, for Peirce, is the moment of transformation, 
and its interpretant a second transformation. Only in this way can he 
account for what he calls the process of enquiry. "A sign is something, 
by knowing which, we know something more".25 Although to proceed, 
scientific investigation must believe in the possibility of a stable truth, 
science would not be what it is, if it did not presuppose the necessity 
for our knowledges to supersede themselves. This may resemble a 
familiar progressivist position, and there is a great deal in Peirce 
which does suppose the implacable march of Western rationality 
towards ever more accurate representations. Yet the interest of his 
work does not depend on this faith. For his theory of the sign is posited 
on the absolute instability of meaning. Hence, in the later theory, 
Critic is only a part of logic, and its second part at that: truth values 
are subject to the destabilising mechanism of interpretation. The 
interpretant is both that which follows through the implications of a 
sign, draws conclusions in such a way as to produce propositions in 
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their turn open to the same process, and that which by definition 
raises questions, brings doubt to bear upon a statement not from the 
position of automatic sceRticism that he derides in Descartes, but from 
the position provided by another necessarily discontinuous set of 
statements.'" 
Another way in which the traditional theory of representation is 
problematised in Peirce is in what has frequently, but I think 
mistakenly, been taken to be his idealism. The object and the 
interpretant are not of distinct substances, they are not different 
orders of phenomena fwm the sign or representamen. The process of 
signhood, which Peirce calls 'semiosis', is deemed to be continuous: 
that is, nothing that is not of the order of a sign can translate, or be 
translated by, a sign. From this it follows that the three terms of the 
sign relation, the object. the representamen, and the interpretant, are 
not distinguished from each other by different essences or inherent 
properties, but by their respective places in the process: 
FIG. F 
SIGN SIGN SIGN 
2 3 
represen tamen object interpretant 
The sign has materiality primarily as event: it brings the object into 
relation with the interpretant, it permits of the decipherment of the 
world. Notice that in this phrase, which I borrow, modified, from 
Yietz/' and which is very much in the spirit of Barthes, the object is 
taken to be not neutral - an amorphous mass, pure substance, or "in 
itself" -but rather, the always already significant world as defined 
by the multifarious systems and practices of culture. Thus, if it is the 
case that the world, as a set of kinds of objects, events, etc., is already 
significant, then the object is a sign. It needs the representamen, 
however, in order for further signifying to occur. Construed in this 
way, Peircean semiosis is signifying practice, but this is not posited in 
individual agency. The object is always already in the social processes 
which both define and destabilise the schemes of things. The 
representamen, we may well say, inserts it in these schemes, leaving it 
open to the interpretant to do as interpretants will. 
A third way in which the traditional theory of representation is 
challenged by Peirce is his slow, and never fully worked out discovery 
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of the importance of the formal determinants of signs in themselves. In 
1867. in his first and still most widely quoted published paper/" Peirce 
had produced his early formulation of the theory of signs. and had 
added to it that signs \\ere of three kinds. When they represent by 
analogy, they are 'icons': by existential -causaL spatial or temporal 
- connection, they are 'indices'; and when they represent by 
convention- a rule or habit that decrees their representational value 
-they are 'symbols'. In 1903, however, there are no less than three 
sets of divisions, called trichotomies, of which this is merely one; by 
combination, these three trichotomies form 10 classes of sign. Figure 2, 
following, shows the original theory; figure 3, the three trichotomies, 
and figure 4, the combination of the three trichotomies to form the 10 
classes: 
Figure 2 
{ 
ICOn 
SIGNS index 
symbol 
(2,281) 
Figure 3 is the crucial one, since it is the basis for fig. 4 of which the 
terminology is formed by a process of combination across the three 
columns of fig. 3, from right to left. The following points should be 
noted in fig. 3: 
-there is a trichotomy for each of the dimensions of signhood: the 
trichotomy of the representamen is the trichotomy of the sign 
considered in itself; the trichotomy of the object- strictly speaking, of 
the relation of representamen and object - is the trichotomy of the 
extension, or logical breadth of a sign, its denotation or subsuming 
power; and the trichotomy of the interpretant - strictly speaking, of 
the three-way correlation- is the trichotomy of the sign as it provides 
the basis for interpretation, its implications, the conclusions -
necessary or not- that can be drawn from it. 
-working from right to left, the trichotomies can be read as (3) 
-complete signhood, (2) sign hood with the dimension of interpretation 
bracketed off, and (1) sign hood with both interpretation and representa-
tion bracketed off, leaving 'the sign taken in itself' to mean 'the sign as 
having the power/potential to (a) represent something and (b) 
determine a second, interpreting sign. 
-none of the terms in any of the columns now stands as the name 
of a class of signs, but as the predicate defining a dimension of a 
lst 
2nd 
1rrl 
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FIGURE 4 
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dicPnt sign/proposition 
argument 
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Symbol - Sy m holic 
L<>gis.i15n Legisign 
OX) 
Dicent 
Symbol 
Le~Lqjgn 
<vm 
Dicent 
Indexical 
Legis.ign 
(2,264) 
dimension of signhood; thus,, fig. 3 represents an analysis of the 
structure of signhood, where fig. 2 is a diagram of the genus 'sign' and 
its species. 
It follows from this reading of two figures that the status of the terms 
'icon', 'index' and 'symbol' has changed, and that these words no 
longer mean the same thing in the state of the theory corresponding to 
figure 3 as they did in the previous state. Now turning to contrast 
figures 2 and 4, each a diagram of the classes of signs and 
corresponding, respectively, to the early and later versions of the 
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theory, it is clear that the new scheme gives a place to the 'sign in 
itself' which was unavailable to it under the old scheme. While the 
distinction between 'icon' 'index' and 'symbol' is implicitly drawn in 
terms of formal considerations, these are never specified as such, and 
the material form of a sign is rarely seen as more than a trivial concern 
with the accidents, as distinct from the essence, of the function of the 
sign. 
Not only do we have, in the new scheme, a place for the sign in itself, 
but this place is potentially of considerable interest. In the place of the 
qualisign, it is not difficult to imagine the material determinants 
(sound, colour, line) of the signs of different media; while the relation 
of sinsign to legisign is that of the instantiation of the law of a form, 
sufficiently close to the kind of distinction made by Saussure between 
langue and parole for the theory of codes to be articulated with 
Peircean theory at this point. But there is everything wrong with the 
way Peirce di~cusses this trichotomy- everything that sets it at odds 
with all that has been most productive in the European tradition as it 
arose from, and was largely determined by, technical linguistics. For 
this reason, Peirce cannot authorise the process of rewriting that it 
would be necessary to engage in in order to effect the join in this way. 
Which does not lead to the conclusion that it cannot, or should not be done. 
But not here, not now. 
Allow me to recapitulate: the question of Peirce's early work, 
following Kant, is, how the mind knows the world, or how the world 
turns into knowledge. The answer that is proposed is, through the 
mediation of representation(s). The place of perception in this problem 
is instructive: when we perceive, Peirce claims, we do not simply 
record the raw imput of our senses; perception is the organisation of 
sense data, it is never "raw", never unmediated by the structures of 
meaning. Perception is to the sense data, as predication is to the 
subject of a proposition. Perception is, therefore, a form of interpreta-
tion.31 The percept is always already a sign. Yet why does the question 
of perception take its place in the theory of knowledge? It is, in Peirce 
as elsewhere, the classic form of the epistemological problematic,. the 
model that represents- the use of this term is not coincidental- the 
individual head coming to terms with its environment according to the 
Enlightment privileging of sight as knowledge: while all the senses are 
thought as channels for the entry of the outer to the inner space of 
reason, they are organised hierarchically from the sense of smell, allied 
to the instinctual and the animal, to the sense of sight, allied to the 
understanding and the ambiguity of the term 'vision'. Above this only 
is the blindness of Homer and the seers, which is called insight. Until 
'the sign' takes its place within a theory of code, the traditional form of 
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the questions of the knowing subject and the known object cannot be 
radically altered. The placement of sign·theory within the ambit of 
social practice and the theorisation of the code as a socially ratified 
system of differentials, displace the framework of the subject/object 
and introduce the question of the formal and material conditions under 
which a knowledge, or a signification, can emerge. 
My view of the development of Peirce's theory of signs is that at a 
certain point, under conditions which I cannot detail here, the 
problematic of representation is displaced in just this way. Starting 
with the post·Kantian problematic of the mediation of the world and 
the mind, it arrives at a point which admits of, but does not elaborate, 
a theory of the formal and material conditions of signhood. When this 
is in place, as the First Trichotomy, it effects a radical shift in the 
discursive economy governing the sense of the terms in the rest of the 
theory. No sign can ever be, simply, "an icon", "an index" or "a 
symbol" again. These terms become adjectives which must combine 
with others from the Third Trichotomy, to qualify the nominal terms 
from the First Trichotomy. The interest of the actual classifications 
displayed in Figure 4 may not be very great: my purpose in this paper 
is not to discuss this issue, but rather to point to the importance of the 
theoretical move that has resulted in the elaborated theory. Signs are 
now no longer classified in terms of their representational power; they 
are classified in terms of how each dimension of sign hood is acting on 
each other. 
As a result of this move, there are no signs to start with. Any sign is 
the discursive product of the interaction of one member of each 
trichotomy. Signs are therefore made, rather than used. They are not 
the constituent units of a pre-existent code, but the outcome of rule· 
governed practices with material qualities. Or rather, this is what I 
can say about the theory represented in figures 3 and 4. Peirce did not. 
Nor, I think, could he have done so. But that, too, is another story. And 
correlatively with the failure to pursue these implications, there is also 
the failure to see that the elaborated theory raises the question that I 
alluded to at the beginning of this paper. The elaborated theory 
remains a theory of representation: under the combinatory of figures 3 
and 4, no sign can be produced that might exclude the representational 
dimension. All ten classes of sign "pass through" the Second 
Trichotomy; they all have objects. Thus no interpretant -no reading 
- can be produced in the Peircean scheme that could skip from the 
third to the first trichotomy; no reading could be a reading of the 
formal/material conditions of the sign without a content of some sort. 
Only if figure 3 were the names of classes of signs, instead of the rules 
underpinning the production of the classes, could music, for instance, 
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count as a semiotic system. Or non-figural painting. Or algebra. Or 
gestures, or architecture, or table-manners ... The practice of any of 
these formal systems can be considered to take their own rules as 
objects, but I think it would be false to argue from this that they are 
therefore representational. 
The objection could cogently be made at this point, that it is 
precisely a theory that has a place for representation that "we" need 
for the description of such things as photography, film, and most 
verbal discursive practices. That whether in the form of the early 
theory, or the later form, the distinctions between icon, index, and 
symbol are useful for discussing, say, the recognisability of a coded 
content. And a case can be made, and has been made in discussions of 
such painters as Mondrian, that formal compositional practices are 
what remain after recognisable contents have been eliminated, rather 
than being the semiotic sine qua non of such representations. There 
are two arguments here: one is, whether or not to use Peirce at all, and 
the second is, if we do, in which form? Those theories which are my 
business in this paper have answered the first question in the 
affirmative, and have chosen the early Peirce. And the early Peirce can 
be described quite precisely as pre-modernist, in this sense, that if, 
using this framework, you were to eliminate the represented object 
(say a "Tree", by Mondrian), there would be nothing left at all, 
certainly not a formally composed pictural space, but possibly, just 
possibly, a mental intention and a bit of the world.32 
The people who launched the use of Peirce were not really Peirce 
scholars: Metz borrowed from Barthes, and Barthes either from the 
small anthology of Peirce's writings that was in circulation at the 
time, and that is the basis for Benveniste's reading,33 or fromjakobson 
and Jakobson borrowed from Arthur Burks, one of the original editors 
of Peirce with as close a familiarity with Peirce as anyone, a logician, 
whose seminal construing the original classification of signs barely 
alludes to the elaborated theory.34 Our question, then, might be: what 
is it that makes the elaborated theory invisible? But I should prefer to 
modify it, asking instead, what is it about the simple classification that 
appears to correspond to the needs of structuralist semiology? What, 
indeed, are these needs? It is by asking the question in this way that 
we shall see how structuralist semiology became itself, and what it 
was that it became. 
* * * * * 
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Structuralist uses of Peirce 
At the same time as the implications of the theory of signification 
were being pursued by Derrida,3:' the work of Hjelmslev3'i was being 
retrieved primarily as an attempt to theorise the signified, in such 
work as Greimas' Semantique structurale:17 and the subsequent 
productions of the group of workers that gathered around Greimas' 
seminars. In Hjelmslev, the sign is theorised as having two "planes", 
the expression and the content, and each of these is articulated as a 
form and a substance. In place of the Sausserean imperative, which 
ties the signified to its signifier, without which it is strictly 
unthinkable, in Hjelmslev, we have a theory which allows the two 
relative autonomy. In work following Saussure, the signified is the 
product of the signifier, in a non-transitive or asymmetrical relation; in 
work following the Hjelmslevian line, they are viewed as parallel and 
distinct, Eco explaining that it is the rules of the code that provide the 
rules of correlation between the two planes. JR It is in Greimas' work, 
however, that the paradox to which this gives rise is fully revealed: 
this is a semantics tied in no way to a theory of the sign, and it is 
accepted in this school that this is a semiotics governed by the concept 
of "the form of the content" which is not thought in terms of the 
material determinants of sign hood. This, of course, is the re-emergence 
of the disembodied signified- said to be given in discourse, certainly, 
but where "discourse" is a term not theorised through a theory of code 
and medium as the enabling conditions of the semiotic. Eco's 
insistence on correlation prevents him from falling into this trap, 
though it cannot eliminate the existence of the trap itself; while 
Jakobson on the other hand has no truck with a view of meaning that 
is not the product of coded convention.3Y While I would want to add to 
this view of signification the notion that the sign is not merely a 
material form, but an event, my sympathies lie in general with 
Jakobson on this point. However, my thesis will be (a) that, whether in 
the Jakobsonian or the Hjelmslevian framework, Peirce is used 
primarily to supplement the theory of the signified, as if this were a 
separate problem from the theory of signhood, and (b) that in both 
frameworks, the signified has returned as a representation, precisely 
because the sign no longer has the job of enabling it, but is there to 
"mediate" or to "vehicle" it. 
It is not at all certain that in much recent work, signification and 
representation are seen to be antagonistic. Indeed, in many places, 
they may even appear to be interchangeable, and, according to the 
dictates of good style, which tell us that we should vary our vocabulary 
as much as possible, the more synonyms we can use for any concept, 
the better. But notice that this stylistic precept is based on the idea 
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that the concept remains the same, though the word might change. It 
is - dare I say it? "in other words" - a precept based on 
representationalism: the concept is somehow independent, the word 
merely conveys it. The word is the name for the concept, as arbor is the 
Latin name for tree. Let me remind you, therefore, that Saussure made 
it clear that representation and signification were quite distinct 
notions of how language works: 
For some people, when language is brought back to its first 
principles, it is seen as a nomenclature, a list of terms 
corresponding to so many things. This conception can be 
criticised from many points of view. It supposes ready-made 
ideas ... (p. 97)40 
The linguistic sign binds not a thing and a name, but a concept 
and an accoustic image. (p. 98) 
The bond uniting signifier to signified is arbitrary ... (p. 100) 
The signs of politeness ... are established by rule; it is this rule 
that compels their use, not their intrinsic value ... (p. 101) 
There are no preestablished ideas, nothing is distinct prior to 
language. (p. 155) 
In semiological systems, like language, where the elements are 
held together in a reciprocal equilibrium by definite rules, the 
problem of the identity I of a sign I is the same as the problem of 
its value. (p. 154) 
... language can be nothing but a system of pure values ... (p. 155) 
... the solidarity of a linguistic system is the product of all its 
elements; the value of one term is the product of the simultaneous 
presence of all the others (p. 159) 
... instead of ideas given in advance, we find values produced by 
the system. (p. 162) 
In the passage just quoted, .Saussure argues that value is only one 
aspect of signification; this latter is the relation of signified to signifier, 
while value is the relation of sign to sign in the paradigmatic 
dimension. Here, it is not made clear exactly what function he ascribes 
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to value in the formation of signification, but this is clarified at the end 
of the chapter: 
... instead of ideas given in advance,[ we find] values produced by 
the system. When we say, then, that they correspond with 
concepts, we mean that these concepts are purely cjifferential, 
defined not positively by their content, but negatively, by their 
relations with the other terms of the system [ ... ] The real 
interpretation of the diagram 
signifier 
signified 
is to symbolise signification ... the concept is in no way originary: 
it is a value determined by its relation with other similar values, 
without which there would be no signification. (p. 162) 
Saussure goes on to gloss his own procedure: 
When I stay at the level of the association of concept with 
accoustical image, I am making a move that may be more or less 
precise, and may give some idea of reality; but in no way am I 
talking about the linguistic fact in its essential features or in its 
fullness. (Ibid.) 
I wish to contrast these arguments with the following passage from 
Metz: 
a child that recognises a car in the street also recognises one in a 
photograph [ ... ] while the one that does not recognise it in a 
photograph is also the one that does not recognise it in the street: 
that is to say, he does not know about cars. 
So at this point, the teacher of images becomes a teacher of 
civilisation, concerned to increase the number of cultural 
objects, or of objects allegedly natural, that his pupils should be 
able to recognise: in practice, this amounts to naming them. The 
lesson in images has become a lesson in things, that is to say, in 
large measure a lesson in words.41 (emphasis added) 
Now, would you trust this man if he tried to sell you a used sign· 
vehicle? - let alone a second·hand semiology. Some people, as 
Saussure was overheard to say in a sinister and menacing tone, think 
that language is just a nomenclature. 
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Metz is something of a naive representationalist. Not that he ever 
actually says that the roving eye of the camera simply captures reality. 
But it is at this point, and because of the insistence with which the 
myth of representation continues to reemerge in his work, that he has 
trouble with the concepts of structuralist semiology, and foremost 
among them, the concept of signification. When he claims that the 
image is a message without a code, his argument turns on the claim 
that there is no paradigmatic dimension in film language, no set of 
quasi-similar choices, no discrete units opposable among themselves. 
This in turn supposes that a paradigm is a set, rather than a 
differential rule that can produce sets. It would seem to follow from 
this argument that there are no values in the Saussurean sense, but 
Metz can hardly claim that. For to do so is to fall into the trap of 
mimeticism, and to assume that the representation of the real is as 
innocent as reality itself. French semiology was too dominated by Barthes 
by this stage for anyone working in the area to neglect the ideological, 
or mythic charge, of the apparently mimetic. So the solution to the 
quandary is sought in the distinction, borrowed from Hjelmslev, 
between denotation and connotation. 1" Connotation is added by the 
discursive dimension, while denotation is merely the re-presentation of 
the real in another medium. It is here that Metz, to be followed by 
innumerable other theorists of the visual, uses the Peircean terms 
"icon" and its synonym "likeness"- for instance, in this passage: 
This is an example of a code that is both "grammatical" and 
"rhetorical", simultaneously and indistinctly both. It is gram-
matical because it guarantees the most literal level of the 
intelligibility of the visual plot (this is a denotative code even 
though it is also strongly connotative) ... 
There are of course other codes that come together to organise 
the play of smaller syntagmatic elements ]but at the level of the 
smallest elements] there is a problem: among these codes ... 
which are specifically cinematographic, and which are simply 
integrated into the filmed spectacle? In the second case, we have 
to do with what is usually, in these discussions, called "reality", 
a set of perceptive, iconographic and symbolic structures that 
preexist the intervention of the camera and which the camera 
simply relays in the guise of an analogical recording ("represen ta-
tion ", "iconicity" in the parlance of American semioticians, 
"likeness" in that of Peirce)- but this does not prevent it from 
superimposing on these images its specific codes. 13 (emphasis 
added) 
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Denotation, it seems, is the simple recording of reality. The inten·ention 
of the camera may superimpose the coded upon these images, but these 
images are thought of as distinct from this codification. The use of 
terms such as "icon" "representation" and "likeness" is a strategy for 
guaranteeing that this stupendously unsemiotic concept - a camera 
that relays "reality" in the form of non· or pre-coded images - can 
nonetheless be said to be producing "signs". Now, of course. Metz does 
not stay in this bind. In a text designed to correct the naiw reliance on 
"the icon". he invokes Peirce as "initiator" of research into signs that 
operate by resemblance. Modifying Peirce in the light of his mm recent 
work, he claims that "resemblance is itself codified"."" But yet again, it 
is a curious fact that he should persist in the assumption that what 
governs the identity of an image is the identification of its denoted 
content. His way of getting "beyond the analogy fix" (a free rendition 
of the title of the essay to which I am alluding"') is to discuss the 
interaction of verbal languages and images: 
the visible world and the idiom are not strangers to one another: 
while their coded interaction has not yet been studied in any 
detail, and while their relationship can hardly be conceived as a 
servile copy of one by the other ... it is still the case that one of the 
functions of language, amongst others, is to name the units the 
eye picks out (but also to help it to pick them out), and that one of 
the functions of sight is to inspire the semantic configurations of 
language (but also to be inspired by them). These are the 
problems of the relation between language and perception ... 46 
(emphasis added) 
The question as stated in the "teaching of civilisation" passage are 
still with us; far from avoiding the trap set by the notions of 'literal 
denotation', 'images that relay reality' and so on, this passage 
continues to work on the premise that it is language alone that is 
genuinely semiotic. Notice that "the image" has given way, here, to the 
"visible world", and ultimately, to "perception". Classical epistemology 
is still in place, eliding the possibility of thinking the image as a 
signifying practice in favour of objects of the real, admitted to the 
mind, and named. 
If 'language' is arbitrary and conventional, it would seem, images 
must be "Natural". The position is spelt out by Peter Wollen in a 
text-book style presentation of "The semiology of the cinema". 
Wollen's view is that the principle of the arbitrary sign had the 
unfortunate consequence that "would be semiologists found themselves 
limited to such micro-languages as the language of traffic signs ... [and] 
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many of these \\·ere parasitic on verbal language proper." 1; Wollen 
seems particular)\· concerned at the implications of Barthes' gnomic 
pronouncement that. rather than linguistics being a branch of 
semiology. semiology should be considered a branch of linguistic. 
Linguistics. with its reliance on the principle of arbitrariness, might 
take over, making it impossible to talk about non-arbitrary signs: 
This seems a desperate conclusion. The prO\·ince turns out to be 
so much 'the most complex and universal' that it engulfs the 
whole.~· 
Implicit in Wollen's fear is the assumption that the specificity of 
the cinematic image is such that it cannot be theorised on the basis 
of the same principles as the 'linguistic sign', that the differences 
between them are such that the theory of one threatens the other 
with annihilation. 
Saussure's discussion of the place of 'natural signs' in semiology 
bears reconsideration at this point. It is a "passing remark": 
when semiology is organised, it will have to think about whether 
modes of expression which depend on entirely natural signs -
such as pantomine - fall by right within its scope. Let us 
suppose that it does welcome them: even so, its principal 
objective will still be the set of systems based on the arbitrary 
nature of the sign. In fact, any socially ratified means of 
expression rests in principle on a collective habit or, and this 
amounts to the same thing, on convention. The signs of 
politeness, for instance, which are often invested with a kind of 
natural expressivity (think of the Chinese who salutes his 
emperor by bowing nine times to the ground), are nonetheless 
determined by a rule; it is this rule that compels their use, not 
their intrinsic value. So we can say that those signs that are 
entirely arbitrary display better than the others the ideal of the 
semiological function; this is why language, the most complex 
and wide-spread of the systems of expression, is also the most 
characteristic; in this sense linguistics can become the general 
model of the whole of semiology, even though language is only a 
particular system. (pp. 100-101) 
There is an apparent equivocation in this passage: on one hand, 
'natural signs' are discussed as if they are a specific class, but on the 
other, as the argument progresses, they are seen to fall within the 
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province of a general semiology only insofar as their "natural 
expressivity" is displaced as the criterion of their class-definition. 
They are "systems". and these systems are rule-gm·erned: \\·hether or 
not they are naturally exj}ressive, this is taken as relatiwly irreleYant 
to their use. They will fall within the scope of a general semiology only 
if they can be defined as belonging to the same class of objects as 
semiology takes as its specific province. The model of this class is the 
linguistic sign. In the continuation of this passage. \\·hich goes on to 
discuss the apparent naturalness of two classes of linguistic sign -
onomatopeia, and exclamation - Saussure argues that the kind of 
imitation of natural sounds that a language can effect is alre<,dy 
governed by the conventions of the system. and that words formed in 
this way will nonetheless be subject to grammatical rules on the same 
basis as words formed from entirely arbitrary roots. and that 
exclamations display what Barthes was later to call "l'effet du reel", 
differing from language to language in the same systematic \\·ays as 
the rest of the lexicon. 
Wollen's argument assumes. by contrast, that "natural signs" are (I 
am tempted to say "by nature") a distinct class of objects: 
... our experience of the cinema suggests that great complexity of 
meaning can be expressed through images[ ... ] The implication of 
this is that it is not only systems exclusively 'grounded on the 
arbitrariness of the sign' which are expressive amd meaningful. 
'Natural signs' cannot be so readily dismissed as Saussure 
imagined. 
(My reading of the foregoing passage in Saussure is that it does not 
'dismiss natural signs', but that it dismisses the argument that some 
signs are natural.) 
It is this demand for the reintegration of the natural sign into 
semiology which led Christian Metz, a disciple of Barthes, to 
declare that cinema is a language, but a language without a 
code ... 
What is needed is a more precise discussion of what we mean by 
a 'natural sign' and by the series of words such as 'analogous', 
'continuous', 'motivated' which are used to describe such signs 
by Barthes, Metz and others. Fortunately the groundwork 
necessary for further precision has already been accomplished, 
by Charles Sanders Peirce, the American logician.49 (emphasis 
added) 
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The theoretical sophistication of the Saussurean move is to shift the 
focus from the representational to the systemic, and to claim that 
pantomime is a semiological system only insofar as it is defined as a 
system governed by conventional rules. To retain the representational 
dimension as the criterion for signhood is to focus on the content, a 
"meaning [that] can be expressed through images"; it is to forget that 
mime, images, or good manners are the enabling condition for the 
formation of certain kinds of meanings. The Saussurean move depends 
on the requirement that a theory, to be cogent, must rest on a 
consistent definition of its object. The Metz and Wollen position would 
have respected this requirement had it concluded that images and 
other "natural signs" could not take their place within semiology. 
Instead, it seeks to extend "semiology" by "integrating" a heteroclite 
object. It is in this way that it was able to produce such paradoxical 
statements as the one that holds that "cinema is a language, but a 
language without a code".50 Metz and Wollen stands as the paragon 
example of my argument, that Peirce is brought in to supplement 
Saussure, as the natural is to the artificial, as epistemology is to 
semiology. 
If, to return to Peter Wollen's metaphor, the province threatens to 
"engulf" the whole, this "whole" (the class of natural signs) must be 
saved, must not be theorised as if it's the same, must be allowed its 
inherent difference. I am reminded of Jonah and the whale: mankind, 
that was given dominion over the earth and all its creatures, is very 
small beer for the monsters of the deep. The threat is that nature, if 
we're not good boys, will swallow up culture. But Wollen's version of 
the myth is curiously reversed. It is natural signs that are at risk, 
natural knowledge, we might say, uncoded, uncluttered by the overlay 
of convention. Recall, that it is through the eye that the world enters 
the .mind without cultural intervention. Natural knowledge is the 
great humanist myth. Now it is this myth that is at issue in Peirce's 
rewriting of Kant, and in particular in his construal of perception as 
interpretation, construing, and thus constructing the object in the 
course of enquiry. (We might take as an example of this process the 
object of the term 'sign', reworked in the debate between a representa-
tional epistemology, and a semiology.) This rewriting of the theory of 
signs alters the statu's of the "icon". In the early theory, it is a kind of 
sign giving a likeness of a real thing, and is even used by Peirce to 
argue that the interpretation of a symbol must rely on a "mental 
icon" of the kind of thing denoted by the symbol. This is a fully-blown 
"picture theory" of language. In the later theory, however, the icon is 
an analytical diagram providing the grounds for a hypothesis about the 
structure of reality. It could only become this when it was no longer a 
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kind of sign in its own right, but an aspect of signhood, governed on the 
one hand by the conventions of interpreting systems, and on the other, 
by the formal and material conditions of signhood itself. But this post-
humanist Peirce is not the one that is generally read, known, or, more 
seriously, sought after. When the semiological whale swallows Jonah, 
it is a monstrous, not a natural act, while its victim is the natural man 
of humanist epistemology. 
The 'natural signs', needless to say, are taken by Wollen to be the 
icon and the index: 
An icon, according to Peirce, is a sign which represents its object 
mainly by its similarity to it; the relationship between signifier 
and signified is not arbitrary but is one of resemblance or 
likeness. 
An index is a sign by virtue of an existential bond between itself 
and its object. 51 
What you should notice in this gloss is the slide between two sets of 
terminology; the Saussurean terminology of "signifier" and "signified", 
which are the 'signs' of the theory of signification, and the Peircean 
terminology of "sign" and "object", as if there were no difference 
between them. Jakobson sins in the same way: 
Peirce ... makes a clear-cut distinction between the "material 
qualities, the signans of any sign, and its 'immediate interpretant", 
that is, the signatum. Signs (or representamina in Peirce's 
nomenclature) offer three varieties of semiosis, three distinct 
"representative qualities" based on different relationships between 
the signans and signa tum. The difference enables him to discern 
three cardinal types of signs. 
1) the icon acts chiefly by a factual similarity between its 
signans and signa tum, e.g. between the picture of an animal and 
the animal pictured; the former stands for the latter "merely 
because it resembles it." 
2) The index acts chiefly by a factual existential contiguity 
between its signans and signatum ... 
[these] semiotic deliberations revive the question, astutely 
discussed in Cratylus ... : does language attach form to content 
"by nature" ... or "by convention"?52 
Notice that for Jakobson, there are three sets of interchangeable 
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terms: he replaces 'signifier' and 'signified' by 'signans' and 'signatum', 
then allows 'signatum' to carry the weight of the two Peircean terms 
- 'object' and 'immediate interpretant'; finally, they are conflated 
with 'form' and 'content'. This tells us a number of things: firstly, 
'signatum' is not the same as 'signified'. For Saussure, and for 
Benveniste following him, value is the product of difference: the 
system is a system of values, and each sign has a value made up of the 
combination of its signifier and its signified, each of which is defined 
by reciprocal contrast with its neighbours in the network. In his Six 
Lectures on Sound and Meaning,>:J however, Jakobscm explicitly 
reduces the scope of this principle. It is only, he says, phonology that is 
properly described by the concept of negative difference. This is 
because only the distinctive features are simply discriminatory, 
without a meaning in themselves. The signs at any of the higher levels 
of language, he claims, are 'positive', precisely because they are 
correlated with a content. Hence, for Jakobson, there is no incompatib-
ility between the 'object' and the 'signa tum', and the precision of the 
concept of the signified, especially as glossed by Benveniste for whom 
it is merely another discriminatory feature, is thereby lost.' 1 
The second thing that we learn from Jakobson's synonyms is that 
the crucial Peircean distinction between the object and the interpretant 
is conflated to become this positive content. If the (immediate) object 
and the (immediate) interpretant are equivalent, then again, we have a 
binary relation, the relation of word to (mediated) world, and the 
productiveness of the principle of infinite semiosis is reduced to the 
reproduction of a content, "in other words". 
There is a complex equivocation in Jakobson's position at this point. 
As linguistic semiotician, the practical use that he makes of 'iconicity' 
and 'indexicality' is precisely to submit them to the imperatives of a 
code. Thus, the "kind of imitation that language [uses toj attach the 
signans to the signatum" is that "the arrangement of the words in the 
sentence, for instance"55 may correspond to a sequence of events, or a 
hierarchical ranking. While the application of a principle such as this 
must be subject to the grammatical rules of the language in question, 
Jakobson's use of such words as "reflect", "reproduce" and "correspond 
to" shows that he is up against something of the same problem that we 
saw in Metz. Jakobson speaks of linguistic "devices" whereby such 
correspondence between word and world is produced, but nonetheless 
has a tendency to claim that such devices are a universal property of 
language, in the sense of langage, rather than specific coding devices 
produced differently by different systems. As if the business of langage 
were to correspond to the world as it stands. In an article entitled 
"Quest for the essence of language", representational claims such as 
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this take on greater status than we might have expected them to have 
in the theoretical perspective grounded by the "distinctive feature". 
Jakobson ;seems to want it both ways. On the one hand, the idea that 
the world is there to be spoken about allows the construal of index and 
icon as "natural signs"; but on the other hand Jakobson well knows 
that there is no such thing. The philosophical contradiction has little 
practical importance for him, since he is far too concerned with the 
furtherance of descriptive linguistics for the issue to be an issue. It 
may be better, for this reason, not to take Jakobson for the theorist of 
meaning he has been claimed to be, to leave him. so to speak, to his 
own devices. But we cannot. His work is too prominent. is used in too 
many places to too many purposes, for me to desist. Jakobson. I am 
about to argue, is, not a naive, but a wily old representationalist. 
Jakobson is celebrated, for instance by Kristeva.~'; for permitting the 
reintroduction of the spoken and speaking subject. and is taken in 
general to the psycho-analytical heart for his theory of child language 
acquisition. We should recall that the bi-axial theory of language 
which he uses not only as the basic conceptual framework for his 
theory of the structure of linguistic systems, and the poetic, is also the 
basis of his theory of the acquisition and the loss of language: 
'contiguity' and 'similarity', and the projection of one on to the other, 
provide, in the famous paper on aphasia.~~ the framework for 
discussing language disorders, artistic styles, and rhetoric. What had, 
in Saussure. the restricted status of a model for construing the term 
'system', is here given astonishing explanatory power. The elegance of 
the argument is more than a little seductive, but, moderately resistant 
after years of reading Jakobson, I am led to wonder, not how this 
explanatory power is drawn from the model of the two axes, but what 
is at stake when it is. 
Jakobson's version of the theory of hi-axiality is not quite the same 
as Saussure's. In this latter, the syntagm is the principle of the chain 
of signifiers- the sound chain, as well as the rules for morphological 
affixion and syntax. The paradigm is the open set of items that can 
occur in any slot as defined by this chain. The syntagm works "in 
praesentia", the paradigm, "in absentia". The syntagm functions by 
joins and gaps (difference), the paradigm by the substitution of similar 
or different items. When Jakobson reworks this set of concepts, you 
will recall, he does so by summing them up in the distinction between 
"similarity" and "contiguity". Now, similarity (or association) and 
contiguity are the twin terms of 19th century psychology of perception, 
having there the function of defining the two kinds of organisation of 
sense-data into knowledge. Recalling that Jakobson published his first 
paper in 1921, his invocation of this framework is unsurprising. And 
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while it is possible also to read Saussure's oppositiOn between 
'paradigm' and 'syntagm' as being based, likewise, on the same theory 
of psychology, this would obscure the fact that Saussure transforms 
this pair through the use of models in grammar, where Jakobson 
treads, I submit, the same path in the opposite direction. Furthermore, 
by allowing 'contiguity' and 'metonymy' to be virtually inter-
changeable, ]akobson obscures what seems to me to be the obvious 
fact, that a metonym is a figure of rhetoric that works by paradigmatic 
substitution on the same principle as does metaphor. The difference 
between them is thus not a linguistic difference but a representational 
one: a whole is substitued for another whole (metaphor) whereas a part 
is substitued for a whole, or vice versa, in metonymy. Metonymy, 
therefore, is "syntagmatic" or "contiguous" only insofar as the 
signatum is analysed as a whole with parts. And by the same token 
while the paradigmatic is the principle of similarity of the form of the 
signifier, as well as of the signified, when it is aligned with metaphor, 
it is reduced ~o similarity of meaning. Somehow, the dimension of 
discourse is inoperative in the distinction between the two figures. 
Peirce, again not surprisingly, had his notions of perception and 
psychology firmly rooted in the 19th century, and while in his theory of 
signs he claims to set aside notions of psychology in favour of notions of 
logic, the terms "association by similarity" and "contiguity" are not 
uncommon.]akobson, therefore, was not wrong to use them in his gloss 
of Peirce's early theory: 
The icon acts ... by a factual similarity between its signans and 
signa tum ... 
The index acts ... by a factual contiguity between its signans and 
signatum ... (loc. cit) 
But even in the early Peirce, a "fact" is the product of the sign process, 
not the basis of the sign; nor- and this from his very earliest public 
lectures - was psychology given the role of explaining logic and the 
sign-process. So the notion of a factual similarity or contiguity, and the 
explanatory relation between the mind and the sign, cannot be said to 
be authorised by the name of the father of icons and indices. 
We have in]akobson the three points I have discussed in my general 
preamble to the structuralist uses of Peirce: the signans and signa tum 
are separate, needing to be "attached"; there are traces of representa-
tionalism in notions used to construe the signa tum, such as "content", 
"positive", "object", and "factualness"; and a model of the structure of 
language is modified to give a theory of the structure of the mind, 
which in turn is used to discriminate between two kinds of signified 
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contents. The distinction between "metaphor" and "metonymy" as 
used by Jakobson, is exactly the same as the distinction between the 
two kinds of "natural" sign, the icon and the index. 
]akobson, however, is the opposite kind of representationalist from 
Metz and Wollen. For them, the world is a quite different sort of thing 
from language, requiring, therefore, a kind of sign appropriate to its 
forms. For ]akobson, on the other hand, the structure of the natural 
universe is given by the structure of the mind- and, ultimately, of the 
brain. Ontology is gobbled up by the hi-axiality of the larger mammals. 
The world is both distinct, waiting to be reflected by language, and 
able to be reflected without any trouble because the structure of each 
of the two terms of the epistemological relation - the mind and the 
world - is the same as the structure of language. Mediation is not 
even necessary, here, because, as in any phenomenological reworking 
of reflection theory, there is a perfect fit."H 
... More perfect, in any case, than the fit between 'signification' and 
'representation', or semiotics and epistemology, in which the function 
of Peirce is not so much to mediate, as to provide the interface for what 
Derrida would call a graft. 
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